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1 Introduction
In this paper, I wish to revisit a topic that I ad-
dressed many years ago (cf. Jacob 1997) from a
novel perspective. Much philosophy of mind of
the  latter  part  of  the  twentieth  century  has
been  devoted  to  naturalizing  intentionality  or
the contents of mental representations. One of
the  landmarks  of  naturalistic  philosophy  of
mind of the past thirty years is unquestionably
Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic framework. Tele-
osemantic theories are teleological theories that
seek  to  explain  content  by  appealing  to  the
functions of representations. Like most teleose-
mantic  approaches,  Millikan  (1984,  2004)  em-
braces an etiological conception of function, ac-
cording to which functions are  selected effects
(Millikan 1984,  1989b;  Neander 1991,  1995,
2004;  Wright 1973):  the function of  a trait  is
the effect caused by the trait that explains the
continued  reproduction  (survival  or  prolifera-
tion) of past tokens of this trait. 
Millikan’s  teleosemantic  approach is  par-
ticularly  impressive  for  two  related  reasons.
First, it applies in a single stroke to the con-
tents  of  intentional  mental representations,
whose function is to mediate between pairs of
cognitive  mechanisms  located  within  single
brains, and also to the meanings of intentional
conventional linguistic signs, whose function is
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to mediate between pairs of cognitive mechan-
isms located in the brains of distinct individu-
als.  Second,  her  overall  teleological  (or  teleo-
functional)  approach,  based  on  the  etiological
theory of functions, is meant to offer an account
of the proliferation or continued reproduction of
both biological entities and non-biological cul-
tural  things,  such  as  linguistic  and  non-lin-
guistic conventions. 
Following Mayr (1961), evolutionary biolo-
gists  and  philosophers  have  long  argued  that
the distinction between so-called  ultimate and
proximate explanations of biological traits (e.g.,
behaviors) is central to evolutionary theorizing.
Roughly  speaking,  ultimate  explanations  ad-
dress  why-questions: for example, why do birds
sing? Why does singing confer a selectional ad-
vantage (or greater fitness) to birds? Proximate
explanations  address  how-questions:  for  ex-
ample, what are the particular external circum-
stances which trigger singing in birds? What are
the internal brain mechanisms that allow birds
to sing? 
The  distinction  between  ultimate  and
proximate  biological  explanations  raises  some
deep scientific and philosophical questions. One
such question is whether ultimate explanations
should be construed as non-causal  answers to
why-questions.  Some philosophers have argued
that  ultimate  explanations  are  selectional ex-
planations based on natural selection. Natural
selection can account for the prevalence of some
trait in a population of individuals, but it can-
not track the causal process whereby the trait is
generated in each individual in the first place
(Sober 1984, pp. 147–152; Dretske 1988, pp. 92–
93;  Dretske 1990,  pp.  827–830).  Other  philo-
sophers  have  replied  that  selectional  explana-
tions  are  causal  explanations,  on the grounds
that no token of a trait whose type has been se-
lected  for  fulfilling  its  (etiological)  function
could proliferate unless it was linked by a causal
chain to the earlier production of the selected
effect by ancestor tokens of the same type of
trait (Millikan 1990, p. 808).1 
In this paper, I will not address such per-
plexing issues. I will simply accept the validity
1 For further discussion cf. Jacob 1997, pp. 256–269.
of the distinction and assume that (whether ul-
timate explanations are causal explanations or
not)  ultimate  and proximate  explanations  are
complementary,  not  competing,  explanations.
Given  that  why-questions  are  fundamentally
different from how-questions, it is likely that ul-
timate  explanations  offer  few  (if  any)  con-
straints  on  proximate  explanations,  and  vice
versa. I will further assume that the distinction
carries over from biological to cultural evolution
and applies to the evolution of human commu-
nication (cf. Scott-Philipps et al. 2011). In par-
ticular,  Millikan’s  basic  teleosemantic  account
of  the proliferation of  intentional conventional
linguistic signs can usefully be construed as a
kind of ultimate explanation of human (verbal
and non-verbal) communication. Its main task
is to address questions such as: what is the evol-
utionary or cultural function of human commu-
nication? Why do humans engage in communic-
ation at all? As with other kinds of ultimate ex-
planations, it needs to be supplemented by spe-
cific  proximate  explanations  whose  role  is  to
disclose the particular human cognitive capacit-
ies and mental processes whereby humans pro-
duce  and  understand  intentional  conventional
signs. 
The goal of this paper is to assess the bal-
ance between Millikan’s broad teleosemantic ap-
proach to the cooperative function of human com-
munication and the choice of particular proximate
psychological  mechanisms that she endorses.  In
particular,  I  will  focus  on  her  anti-mentalistic
view,  namely  that  verbal  understanding of  an-
other’s utterance is a kind of direct perception of
whatever the utterance is about, and her correlat-
ive rejection of the basic Gricean pragmatic as-
sumption that verbal understanding is an exercise
in mindreading. One of the distinctive features of
the human mindreading capacity is  that it  en-
ables individuals to make sense of two kinds of
agency: instrumental and communicative agency.
In order to make sense of an agent’s instrumental
action, one must represent the contents of both
her motivations and epistemic states. In order to
make sense of an agent’s communicative action,
as Grice has basically argued, the addressee must
infer what the agent is trying to convey, i.e., her
communicative  intention,  whose  very  fulfilment
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requires that it is  recognized by the addressee.
What is distinctive of human intentional commu-
nication  is  that  it  enables  the  communicative
agent to cause her addressee to acquire new psy-
chological states, and thereby to manipulate his
mind. 
Thus,  I  shall  examine  the  contrast
between the particular proximate mechanisms
favored  by  Millikan  and  the  Gricean  prag-
matic  tradition.  In  the  first  section,  I  shall
spell out the basic Gricean mentalistic frame-
work.  In the second section,  I  will  spell  out
Millikan’s  teleosemantic  machinery.  In  the
third  section,  I  will  examine  Millikan’s  view
that verbal understanding is an extended form
of perception. In the fourth section, I will ex-
amine the extent to which Millikan’s account
of conventions can support her rejection of the
Gricean assumption that verbal understanding
is an exercise in mindreading. Finally, in the
last section, I  will  show that recent develop-
mental  findings  in  the  investigation  of  early
human  social  cognition  are  relevant  to  the
controversy between Millikan and the Gricean
tradition over the choice of proximate mechan-
isms underlying human communication. 
2 The Gricean mentalistic picture of 
communicative agency 
The Gricean mentalistic tradition rests on three
basic related assumptions.2
• The first  is  the assumption that  the  complete
process whereby an addressee contributes to the
full  success  of  a  speaker’s  communicative  act
should be decomposed into two separable psycho-
logical sub-processes: a process of  understanding
(or  comprehension)  of the  speaker’s  utterance
and a process of acceptance, which in turn can be
construed as the addressee’s  acquiring either a
new belief or a new desire for action (depending
on the direction of fit of the speaker’s utterance).
I’ll call this the separability thesis. 
2 Although  the  relevance-based  approach  advocated  by  Sperber &
Wilson (1986) and Wilson & Sperber (2004) departs in some inter-
esting respects from Grice’s (1969,  1989) own approach, I will non-
etheless call their approach “Gricean” because, in the context of the
present paper, the continuities between the two frameworks are far
more important than the discontinuities. 
• The Gricean mentalistic tradition also rests
on the assumption that verbal understanding
is  an exercise  in  mindreading,  whereby the
addressee  recognizes  the  complex  psycholo-
gical state that underlies the speaker’s com-
municative act. I’ll call this the mindreading
thesis.  (Clearly,  the  mindreading  thesis  is
presupposed  or  entailed  by the separability
thesis.)
• Third, the Gricean mentalistic tradition fur-
ther  rests  on  a  fundamental  hypothesized
asymmetry between what is required for un-
derstanding  instrumental non-communicative
agency and communicative agency. An agent
intends her instrumental action to satisfy her
desire in light of her belief, and the desirable
outcome of  her  instrumental  action  can be
recognized even if the agent fails to fulfil her
goal or intention. But the intended effect of a
speaker’s communicative action, which is the
addressee’s understanding of what she means,
cannot be achieved unless the speaker’s in-
tention to achieve this effect is recognized (cf.
Sperber 2000, p. 130). Unlike purely instru-
mental agency, communicative agency is  os-
tensive in  the  following  sense.  A  speaker’s
communicative  act  is  ostensive  because  its
desirable outcome cannot be identified unless
the addressee recognizes what the speaker in-
tends  to  make  manifest  to  him,  i.e.,  what
Sperber &  Wilson (1986) call  the speaker’s
informative intention. Thus, the Gricean tra-
dition  rests  on  the  thesis  of  the  ostensive
nature of communicative agency (Sperber &
Wilson 1986). 
2.1 The mindreading thesis 
On the picture of pragmatics which is part of the
Gricean tradition of the past forty years broadly
conceived,  a  human agent  could  not  achieve  a
verbal or non-verbal act of intentional communic-
ation  unless  she  had  a  complex  psychological
state,  which  Grice (1957) called the “speaker’s
meaning”  and  which  he  construed  as  a  set  of
three interrelated intentions.3 First of all, by pro-
ducing an utterance (or any other piece of ostens-
3 For brevity, I’ll use “speaker” instead of “communicative agent”. But
of course not all communicative actions are verbal.
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ive  communicative  behavior),  the  speaker  must
have the basic  intention  (i)  to  act  on her  ad-
dressee’s mind, i.e., to cause him to acquire a new
belief or a new desire (or intention) to perform
some action. Second, the speaker must intend (ii)
her addressee to recognize the content of her basic
intention. Third, she must further intend (iii) her
addressee’s recognition of her basic intention (in
accordance with (ii)) to play a major role in his
fulfilling her basic intention (i). 
In the following, I will adopt (Sperber &
Wilson’s  (1986)  simplified  two-tiered  account,
according to which a communicative agent who
produces an utterance has two (not three) inter-
related  intentions:  an  informative and a  com-
municative intention, the first of which is nested
within the other. She has the informative inten-
tion to make some state of affairs manifest to
her addressee and also the further communicat-
ive intention to make her informative intention
manifest to her addressee. So in this framework,
the  speaker’s  communicative  intention  is  ful-
filled by the addressee as soon as the latter re-
cognizes (or understands) which state of affairs
it is the speaker’s informative intention to make
manifest. But more is required for the speaker’s
informative  intention  to  be  fulfilled:  the  ad-
dressee must further accept the speaker’s epi-
stemic or practical authority. Depending on the
direction of fit  of the speaker’s utterance, the
addressee must either believe the fact which it
is  the speaker’s informative intention to make
manifest to him, or he must acquire the desire
to act so as to turn into a fact the possible state
of affairs which it is the speaker’s informative
intention to make manifest to him.
In a nutshell, much of (Sperber & Wilson’s
(1986) relevance-based framework rests on their
insightful  recognition  that,  on  the  broad
Gricean picture of  the speaker’s  meaning,  the
task of  the addressee  can be  usefully  divided
into  two  basic  psychological  processes:  one  is
the process whereby the addressee  understands
(or recognizes) the speaker’s informative inten-
tion and the other is  the process whereby he
fulfils the speaker’s informative intention. The
first process involves the addressee’s recognition
of the speaker’s informative intention, whereby
the addressee fulfils the speaker’s communicat-
ive intention that he recognize the speaker’s in-
formative  intention.  By  recognizing  the
speaker’s  informative  intention,  the  addressee
comes automatically to both fulfil the speaker’s
communicative intention and to understand (or
comprehend)  the  speaker’s  utterance.  But  for
the addressee to recognize the speaker’s inform-
ative intention is not  ipso facto to  fulfil it. So
the second process needed for the success of the
speaker’s  communicative  act  involves  the  ad-
dressee’s fulfilment of the speaker’s informative
intention, whereby the addressee either accepts
a new belief (in accordance with the content of
the speaker’s assertion) or forms a new desire to
act  (in  accordance  with  the  content  of  the
speaker’s request; cf. Jacob 2011). 
2.2 The separability thesis
While  the relevance-based  account of  commu-
nication  clearly  presupposes  the  mindreading
thesis,  Sperber (2001) has offered further sup-
port in favor of the separability thesis. Follow-
ing  Krebs &  Dawkins (1984),  Sperber (2001)
has argued that for cooperative communication
to stabilize in human evolution, it must be ad-
vantageous to both senders and receivers. Since
the  interests  of  speakers  and  hearers  are  not
identical, the cooperation required for the sta-
bilization of communication is vulnerable to de-
ception. When her utterance is descriptive, the
speaker can speak either  truthfully or untruth-
fully. The addressee can either trust the speaker
or not. The speaker is better off if her addressee
trusts  her  and  worse  off  if  he  distrusts  her,
whether or not the speaker is  truthful.  If  the
addressee trusts the speaker, then he is better
off if the speaker is truthful and worse off if the
speaker is not truthful, while the addressee re-
mains unaffected if he distrusts the speaker. 
Clearly, not every speaker is (or should be)
granted equal  epistemic  or  practical  authority
on any topic by every addressee. As Sperber et
al. (2010) have further argued, given the risks of
deception,  it  is  likely that  human cooperative
communication would not have stabilized in hu-
man  evolution  unless  humans  had  evolved
mechanisms  of  epistemic  vigilance,  whereby
they  filter  the  reliability  of  descriptive  utter-
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ances. Focusing on a speaker’s assertions at the
expense of  her  requests,  a  speaker’s  epistemic
authority depends to a large extent on the ad-
dressee’s evaluation of her reliability (or trust-
worthiness),  which in  turn depends jointly on
the addressee’s evaluation of the speaker’s com-
petence on the topic at hand and on the ad-
dressee’s  representation of  how benevolent are
the speaker’s intentions towards him. According
to  Sperber et  al. (2010),  an  addressee’s  epi-
stemic vigilance can apply to either or both the
source of the information being communicated
and its content. 
3 Millikan’s teleosemantic machinery
3.1 Teleosemantics and informational 
semantics
One of the first attempts at a naturalistic ac-
count of content (or intentionality) in the philo-
sophy  of  mind  was  Dretske’s  (1981)  informa-
tional semantics, according to which a sign or
signal s carries information about property F iff
there is a nomic (or lawful) covariation between
instances of  F and tokenings of  s. As  Millikan
(1984, 2004) emphasized shortly after, informa-
tional semantics faces the puzzle of accounting
for  the possibility of  misrepresentation.  If  the
conditional  probability  that  F is  instantiated
given s is 1, then how could s ever misrepresent
instances of  F? This puzzle is neatly solved by
teleological approaches: if a representation has a
function,  then it  can fail  to fulfil  its function
and thereby misrepresent what it is designed to
represent (Millikan 2004, Ch. 5). According to
Dretske’s (1988, 1995) own later attempt at pre-
serving informational semantics as part of tele-
osemantics, a sign or signal s could not repres-
ent some property  F unless  s had the function
of carrying information about (or indicating) in-
stances of F. 
Millikan’s  (1984,  2004)  teleosemantic  ap-
proach  sharply  departs  from  Dretske’s  (1988,
1995) information-based framework in at least
two fundamental respects. First of all, in  Mil-
likan’s earliest (1984) teleosemantic framework,
there was no room for information-theoretic no-
tions at all. In her later (1989a, 2004) work, she
argued that carrying information could not be a
teleological function of a sign on the following
grounds.  Whether  a  sign  carries  information
about some property depends on how the sign
was  caused or  produced.  But according to the
etiological theory of functions, the function of a
sign is one of its own effects, i.e., the selected ef-
fect that explains the continued reproduction of
tokens  of  signs  of  this  kind.  How a sign was
caused cannot be one of its effects, let alone its
selected effect. If and when a sign happens to
carry information about something, carrying in-
formation cannot be its selected effect, i.e., its
etiological function.4 
Second, Dretske’s (1981) informational se-
mantics  could only be  suitably  naturalistic  in
the required sense if information is construed as
the converse of nomological covariation (or ne-
cessity),  i.e.,  as  an  entirely  non-intentional
and/or non-epistemic  commodity.  But as  Mil-
likan (2004, pp. 32–34) argues, if signal s could
not carry information about F unless the prob-
ability that F is instantiated when s is tokened
were 1 (in accordance with some natural law),
then no animal could ever learn about  F from
perceiving tokens of s. 
In  her  2004 book,  Millikan elaborates  a
notion  of  natural  sign  that  is  more  “user-
friendly” precisely because “it is at root an epi-
stemic notion” (Millikan 2004, p. 37). On  Mil-
likan’s  (2004)  account,  natural  signs  (e.g.,
tracks made by quail) are locally recurrent signs
within  highly  restricted  spatial  and  temporal
domains:  relative  to  one  local  domain,  such
tracks are natural signs of quail. Relative to a
neighboring domain, the very same tracks are
made  by  pheasants  and  are  therefore  natural
signs of pheasants, not quail. Locally recurrent
signs afford knowledge of the world for animals
who can learn how to track the circumscribed
domains relative to which they carry reliable in-
formation.  Furthermore,  locally  recurrent  nat-
ural signs can form transitive chains (or be pro-
ductively  embedded) within  circumscribed do-
4 For significant discussion and defense of the view that it is the etiolo-
gical function of mental representations to carry information, in re-
sponse  to Milikan’s  criticisms,  cf.  Neander (1995,  2007),  Godfrey-
Smith (2006)  and  Shea (2007).  Cf.  the  recent  exchange  between
Neander (2011)  and  Millikan (2011)  For  a  criticism of  Millikan’s
view, cf. Pietroski (1992) and see Millikan’s (2000) reply.
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mains. For example, retinal patterns can be a
natural sign of tracks in the ground, which in
turn may be a natural sign of quail within a cir-
cumscribed  local  domain.  Perception  is  what
enables  non-human animals  and humans alike
to track the meanings of locally recurrent nat-
ural  signs  in  their  circumscribed  domain  of
validity and thereby to acquire knowledge of the
world (Millikan 2004, Ch. 4). 
The application of  Millikan’s (1984, 2004)
teleosemantic framework to the meanings of in-
tentional  conventional signs  results  from  the
combination of three related ingredients: (i) the
etiological view of functions; (ii) acceptance of
the sender-receiver structure as a necessary con-
dition on the contents of intentional representa-
tions; and (iii) a naturalistic account of the re-
production of conventions. 
3.2 The etiological conception of 
functions
As I  said  above,  on  the  etiological  view,  the
function of some trait is its selected effect that
explains  the  continued  reproduction  of  past
tokens  of  this  trait.  This  is  what  Millikan
(1984)  calls  a  device’s  direct proper  function.
But a device may also have what she calls a de-
rived proper function. For example, it is the dir-
ect proper function of the mechanism of color
change in the skin of chameleons to make them
undetectable  from  the  local  background  by
predators. It is a derived proper function of this
mechanism in a particular chameleon, Sam, at a
particular place and time, to make the color of
its skin match the color of its particular local
background at that time so as to make it un-
detectable by predators there and then. 
While Millikan’s teleofunctional framework
based on the etiological approach to functions
primarily fits biological traits, it applies equally
to non-biological items such as non-bodily tools
—including public-language forms. For example,
screwdrivers have the direct proper function of
turning  (driving  or  removing)  screws.  This  is
the  effect  of  screwdrivers  that  explains  their
continued  reproduction.  Clearly,  a  screwdriver
may also be intentionally used for the purpose
of  driving  a  screw  with  a  particular  metallic
structure, length, and diameter into a particular
wooden material at a particular time and place.
If so, then driving this particular screw into this
particular wooden material at a particular time
and place will  be the derived proper function
that  this  particular  screwdriver  inherits  from
the agent’s intention. 
3.3 The sender-receiver framework
According to the sender-receiver framework,  a
sign or signal R can be an intentional represent-
ation (as opposed to a natural sign) only if it is
a relatum in a three-place relation involving two
systems (or mechanisms), one of which is the
sender (who produces R), the other of which is
the receiver (who uses R). By application of the
etiological view of functions, the sender (or pro-
ducer) and the receiver (or consumer) have co-
evolved so that what Millikan (1984, 2004) calls
the  Normal conditions for  the performance of
the function of one depends on the performance
of the other’s function and vice versa. In a nut-
shell,  the  producer  and the  consumer  are  co-
operative devices,  whose  interests  overlap  and
whose  activities  are  beneficial  to  both.  Thus,
the  cooperative  ternary  sender–receiver  struc-
ture naturally applies to the contents of inten-
tional  mental  representations  that  mediate
between cognitive mechanisms located within a
single organism.5 
In virtue of the fact that intentional men-
tal representations can have two basic directions
of fit, the evolved cooperation between the pro-
ducer  and  the  consumer  can  take  two  basic
forms.  If  and  when  the  representation  is  de-
scriptive or has a mind-to-world direction of fit,
the  producer’s  function  is  to  make a  sign  R,
whose content matches some state of affairs  S,
for the purpose of enabling (or helping) the con-
sumer to perform its own task when and only
when S obtains. If and when the representation
is  directive (or prescriptive) or has a world-to-
mind direction of fit, the producer’s function is
to produce a representation whose content will
guide the consumer’s action, and it is the con-
5 Cf. Godfrey-Smith (2013) and Artiga (forthcoming) for further elab-
orate discussion of the requirement of cooperation as a condition on
application of the sender-receiver structure. 
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sumer’s function to make the world match the
content of the sign by its own activities. Fur-
thermore, Millikan (1995, 2004) has argued that
the most primitive kinds of intentional mental
representations (shared by humans and non-hu-
man animals) are what she calls  pushmi-pullyu
representations,  which  are  at  once  descriptive
and prescriptive, with both a mind-to-world and
a world-to-mind direction of fit. 
3.4 Conventional patterns
The  third  component  of  Millikan’s  teleose-
mantic approach to the meanings of intentional
conventional signs involves her (1998) natural-
istic account of conventions. On her account, so-
called  natural conventionality rests on two ele-
mentary  characteristics:  first,  natural  conven-
tions are patterns that are  reproduced (or that
proliferate).  Second,  they  are  reproduced  (or
“handed  down”)  “owing  to  precedent  determ-
ined by historical accident, rather than owing to
properties  that  make  them  more  intrinsically
serviceable than other forms would have been”
(Millikan 2005, p. 188). The fact that conven-
tions rest on historical precedent to a large ex-
tent  accounts  for  their  arbitrariness.6 On  the
basis of her naturalistic account of the contin-
ued  reproduction  of  natural  conventions,  Mil-
likan  further  offers  a  purportedly  naturalistic
account of the continued reproduction of con-
ventional public-language signs, whose function
is  to  coordinate  the  transfer  of  information
between speakers and hearers. She thereby ex-
tends  the  cooperative  ternary  sender–receiver
structure to the meanings of intentional conven-
tional signs (or public-language forms) that me-
diate cognitive mechanisms located within pairs
of distinct organisms. 
Conventional  public-language  forms  are
tools or memes in Dawkins’s (1976) sense: they
have been selected and have accordingly been
reproduced  because  they  serve  coordinating
functions between a sender (the speaker) and a
receiver (the addressee), whose interests overlap.
But like any other tool, in addition to its direct
memetic (or “stabilizing”) function (which ex-
6 Including the arbitrariness of the relation between particular word-
types and what they mean (sense and/or reference). 
plains its continued reproduction), a particular
token of  some public-language  form may also
have  a  derived  function  or  purpose,  derived
from the purpose of the speaker who produced
it at a particular place and time. Thus, a token
of a public-language form has two kinds of pur-
poses:  a  memetic  purpose  and  the  speaker’s
purpose, which may or not coincide (cf. Millikan
1984, 2004, 2005).
4 Is verbal understanding an extended 
form of perception?
4.1 Perceiving the world through 
language
One basic problem raised by Millikan’s account
of  the proliferation of  intentional conventional
signs is that one and the same linguistic form
detached from its context of use may belong to
different  memetic families (or chains of repro-
ductive  events).  In  the  reproductive  process,
what gets copied from one pair of sender-receiv-
ers to the next is not merely a linguistic form
(e.g., “clear”), but the  use of a linguistic form
embedded in a particular  context. This is why
on Millikan’s (2005, Ch. 10, section 3) view, the
boundary between semantics and pragmatics is
blurry and the process whereby a hearer tracks
the memetic lineage of a conventional sign is a
pragmatic  process.  On  the  teleosemantic  ap-
proach, the hearer’s task is to retrieve the ap-
propriate context necessary for recognizing the
correct memetic family (or lineage) to which a
particular conventional sign belongs. In a nut-
shell, the hearers’ task is to track the  domains
of intentional conventional signs. 
Thus,  it  would  appear  that  the  hearer’s
task  is  quite  similar  to  what  is  involved  in
tracking the restricted domain over which the
information carried by a locally recurrent  nat-
ural sign (e.g., tracks made either by quail or by
pheasants) is valid. Since tracking the local do-
mains  over  which  the  information  carried  by
locally  recurrent  natural  signs  is  a  perceptual
task, it is not surprising that Millikan has per-
sistently  urged  that  “in  the  most  usual  cases
understanding speech is a form of direct percep-
tion of  whatever  speech is  about.  Interpreting
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speech does not require making any inferences
or  having  any  beliefs  about  words,  let  alone
about  speaker  intentions”  (Millikan 1984,  p.
62).7 Millikan (2004,  p.  122)  nicely  illustrates
her view that verbal understanding is an exten-
ded form of perception: 
rain does not sound the same when heard
falling on the roof, on earth, on snow, and
on the water, even though it may be dir-
ectly  perceived  as  rain  through  any  of
these media. Exactly similarly, rain has a
different sound when the medium of trans-
mission is the English language (“It’s rain-
ing!”). And it sounds different again when
the medium of transmission is French or
German.
In a nutshell, “during Normal conversation, it is
not language that is most directly perceived by
the hearer  but  rather  the world that  is  most
directly  perceived  through language”  (Millikan
2005, p. 207). 
Furthermore, both ordinary and extended
perception  rest  on  translation,  not  inference:
“the first steps in perception involve reacting to
natural signs of features of the outer world by
translating them into inner  intentional repres-
entations of these outer features, for example, of
edges, lines, angles of light sources in relation to
the  eye”  (Millikan 2004,  p.  118).  In  normal
verbal communication, translation plays a two-
fold  role  in  mediating  transfer  from  the
speaker’s belief to the addressee’s belief. First,
the speaker of a descriptive utterance translates
her  belief  into  a  sentential  conventional  sign.
Secondly, the addressee translates the content of
the speaker’s utterance into his own new belief
(Millikan 1984, 2004, 2005).
4.2 Ordinary and extended perception
Clearly,  Millikan’s  thesis  that  verbal  under-
standing is an extended form of perception is
not  consistent  with  the  Gricean  thesis  that
verbal  understanding  is  an  exercise  in
mindreading.  But on the face of it, the thesis
7 Cf.  Millikan (2000, Ch. 6),  Millikan (2004, Ch. 9),  Millikan (2005,
Ch. 10).
that verbal understanding is an extended form
of perception (of whatever speech is about) itself
is  puzzling for at  least three related reasons.8
First of all, as Millikan (2004, Ch. 9) herself re-
cognizes, there is a major difference between the
content of a perceptual representation of some
state affairs and the verbal understanding of the
content of another’s testimony about the very
same state of affairs. At an appropriate distance
and in good lighting conditions, one could not
perceive a cup resting on a table without also
perceiving  its  shape,  size,  color,  texture,  con-
tent, orientation, and spatial location with re-
spect to the table, to any other object resting
on the table, and especially to oneself. As Mil-
likan  (2004, p. 122) recognizes, unlike the con-
tent of testimony, the content of ordinary per-
ception can be put at the service of action pre-
cisely because it provides information about the
agent’s spatial relation to an object that is po-
tentially relevant for action. But if an addressee
located in a room next to the speaker’s room
understands  the  content  of  the  latter’s  utter-
ance  of  the  sentence  “There  is  a  cup on the
table”, he may endorse the belief that there is a
cup on the table without having any definite ex-
pectation about the shape, size, color, texture,
content, orientation, and spatial location of the
cup with respect to himself, the table, or any-
thing else.
Second, the thesis that verbal understand-
ing is an extended form of perception ought to
be restricted to the hearer’s verbal understand-
ing of the meanings of descriptive utterances of
indicative sentences with a mind-to-world direc-
tion-of-fit, which describe facts (or actual states
of affairs). It cannot without further modifica-
tions be directly applied to the hearer’s verbal
understanding  of  the  meanings  of  prescriptive
utterances  of  imperative sentences  whereby  a
speaker  requests an addressee to  act so  as  to
turn a possible (non-actual) state of affairs into
a fact (or an actual state of affairs). Prescript-
ive utterances, which have a world-to-mind dir-
ection of fit, fail to describe any fact that could
be  directly  perceived  at  all.  So  the  question
arises whether Millikan would be willing to en-
8 Cf. Recanati (2002) for a defense of Millikan’s thesis.
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dorse  the  revised  two-tiered  thesis  that  (i)  a
verbal understanding of a speaker’s descriptive
utterance is the perception of whatever the ut-
terance is about and (ii) a verbal understanding
of a speaker’s prescriptive utterance is to intend
to  perform whatever  action  is  most  likely  to
comply with the speaker’s request. 
Finally,  testimony  enables  a  speaker  to
convey beliefs whose contents far outstrip the
perceptual  capacities  of  either  the  speaker  or
her addressee. For example, an addressee may
understand that the speaker intends to verbally
convey  to  him  her  belief  that  there  is  no
greatest  integer,  that  democracy  is  the  worst
form of government except all those other forms
that have been tried from time to time, or that
religion is the opium of the people. But it does
not make much sense to assume that either the
speaker  or  her  addressee  could  perceive  what
the speaker’s utterance is about. 
4.3 Tracking the domains of intentional 
conventional signs
Furthermore, the thesis that verbal understand-
ing is  an extended form of  perception  clearly
rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  process
whereby  the  hearer  of  a  speaker’s  utterance
tracks  the  memetic  family  of  the  intentional
conventional sign used by the speaker is basic-
ally  the  same as  the  process  whereby human
and non-human animals track the meanings of
locally recurrent natural signs in their circum-
scribed  domain  of  validity.  As  I  mentioned
above, Millikan (2004) argues that perception is
the  basic  process  whereby  animals  track  the
meanings  of  locally  recurrent  natural  signs  in
their  circumscribed  domain  of  validity.  Cru-
cially, one can track the meanings of locally re-
current natural signs within their circumscribed
domain  of  validity  without representing  an
agent’s  psychological  state.  So  the  question
arises whether a hearer of a speaker’s utterance
could always track the memetic family of the in-
tentional conventional signs used by a speaker
without representing any of  the speaker’s psy-
chological states. 
In particular,  as  Recanati (2007) has ar-
gued, the question arises for descriptive utter-
ances containing at least four kinds of conven-
tional expressions considered by Millikan (2004,
Chs.  10–12):  so-called  unarticulated  constitu-
ents in Perry’s (1986) sense, incomplete definite
descriptions,  quantifiers,  and possessives.  Con-
sider first an utterance of (1):
(1) It is raining.
It is unlikely that by an utterance of (1) a
speaker means to assert that it is raining some-
where  or  other  at  the  time  of  utterance.  In-
stead, she is likely to mean that it is raining at
the time of utterance and at the place of utter-
ance (which remains unarticulated in the sen-
tence).  If  by an utterance of  (1),  the speaker
could only mean that it is raining at the place
of utterance, then Millikan’s claim that a hearer
need not represent any of the speaker’s psycho-
logical  states  for  the  purpose  of  tracking  the
local domains of intentional conventional signs
might be vindicated. However, by an utterance
of (1) on the phone, a speaker located in Paris
may mean that it is raining in Chicago, not in
Paris.  Similarly,  a  French  speaker  located  in
Paris may use the incomplete description “the
President” to refer, not to the French President,
but instead to the President of the US. 
For the purpose of understanding an utter-
ance of a sentence containing a universal quan-
tifier, as shown by example (2), the hearer must
be able to properly restrict the domain of the
quantifier:
(2) Everyone is asleep.
By an utterance of (2), the speaker pre-
sumably means to assert, not that everyone in
the  universe  is  asleep,  but  that  everyone  in
some restricted domain (e.g., a relevant house-
hold) is asleep.9 The relevant restricted domain
is the domain the speaker has in mind. Finally,
by  using  the  possessive  construction  “John’s
book”, the speaker may have in mind many dif-
ferent relations between John and the book: she
may mean the book written by John, the book
9 A nice example suggested by a referee is “There is no beer left”, where the audi-
ence does not take the speaker to mean that there is no beer left in the universe,
but instead in some properly restricted domain (e.g., some relevant fridge). 
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read by John,  the book bought by John,  the
book sold  by John,  the  book  John likes,  the
book John dislikes, the book John just referred
to in the conversation, the book John lost, the
book John gave to the speaker,  the book the
speaker gave to John, the book the hearer gave
to John, and so on. Unless the hearer hypothes-
izes what relation the speaker has in mind, he
will fail to understand what the speaker means
by her utterance of “John’s book”. In none of
these four cases does it seem as if  the hearer
could  recognize  the  memetic  family  of  inten-
tional  conventional signs, i.e., track their relev-
ant domains—unless he could represent the con-
tents of some of the speaker’s beliefs or assump-
tions. 
5 Conventions and belief-desire 
psychology
5.1 Teleosemantics and the separability 
thesis
Millikan’s thesis that verbal understanding is an
extended form of perception is meant as an al-
ternative to the Gricean thesis that verbal un-
derstanding is an exercise in mindreading. The
further question arises to what extent Millikan’s
teleosemantic  account  of  the  proliferation  of
public language conventions is  consistent with
the Gricean separability thesis, i.e., the distinc-
tion  between  verbal  understanding  and  either
acceptance (belief) or compliance. I will first ar-
gue that there is a restricted sense in which Mil-
likan’s  teleosemantics  seems  to  be  consistent
with the separability thesis. But I will further
argue that in a broader sense Millikan’s rejec-
tion of the mindreading thesis undermines the
separability thesis. 
On Millikan’s teleosemantic account, for a
speaker’s descriptive utterance of an indicative
sentence to meet the requirement of cooperation
(and  mutual  interest)  between  the  sender  (or
producer)  and the  receiver  (or  consumer),  its
direct proper function must be to cause the ad-
dressee to form a (true) belief. For a speaker’s
prescriptive utterance of an imperative sentence
to meet the requirement of cooperation, its dir-
ect proper function must be to cause the ad-
dressee to act in compliance with the content of
the speaker’s request. 
In the terminology of the relevance-based
framework, a speaker who utters a descriptive
utterance makes manifest to her addressee her
communicative intention to make manifest her
informative intention to make some fact mani-
fest  to  him.  The  addressee  may  fulfil  the
speaker’s communicative intention by recogniz-
ing her informative intention and yet fail to ful-
fil her informative intention by resisting endors-
ing the relevant belief. A speaker who utters a
prescriptive utterance makes manifest to her ad-
dressee  her  communicative  intention  to  make
manifest  her  informative  intention  to  make
manifest to him the desirability of turning some
possible state of affairs into a fact by his own
action. The addressee may fulfil  the speaker’s
communicative intention by recognizing her in-
formative  intention  and  yet  fail  to  fulfil  the
speaker’s informative intention by resisting en-
dorsing the intention to act in accordance with
the speaker’s request. 
Origgi &  Sperber (2000,  pp.  160–161),
who  subscribe  to  the  Gricean  thesis  of  the
separability between verbal understanding and
acceptance or compliance, have argued that the
direct proper function of either a descriptive ut-
terance or a prescriptive utterance could not be
to reliably elicit the addressee’s response “at the
level  of  belief  or  desire  formation”  (i.e.,  “the
cognitive  outputs  of  comprehension”),  but  in-
stead “at an intermediate level in the process of
comprehension”. Millikan might reply that ac-
cording to her teleosemantic framework, an ut-
terance may have a direct proper  function and
yet remain  unfulfilled. If so, then the fact that
an addressee may fulfil the speaker’s communic-
ative intention (by recognizing her informative
intention) and yet fail to fulfil the speaker’s in-
formative  intention  seems  entirely  compatible
with the teleosemantic framework. 
However, to the extent that Millikan ex-
plicitly rejects the mindreading thesis,  which
is presupposed by the separability thesis, it is
unlikely that she would find the separability
thesis  itself  acceptable.  On  the  relevance-
based approach, it is a sufficient condition for
securing  what  Austin (1975)  called  the  “up-
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take” (or success) of a communicative act (or
speech  act)  that  the  speaker  causes  the  ad-
dressee  to  fulfil  the  speaker’s  communicative
intention by recognizing her informative inten-
tion.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  addressee
further  fulfil  the speaker’s  informative  inten-
tion.  Successful  communication  does  not  re-
quire the addressee to accept either a new be-
lief  or  a  new desire,  in  accordance  with  the
speaker’s  informative  intention.  But  on  Mil-
likan’s teleosemantic framework, failure of the
addressee to comply with the speaker’s goal of
causing the addressee to accept either a new
belief  or a  new desire  looks like a failure of
the addressee to cooperate with the speaker’s
conventional  action,  and  therefore  like  a
breakdown of the speaker’s communicative ac-
tion. In fact,  Millikan (2000,  2004,  2005) has
offered  two  broad  grounds  for  rejecting  the
mindreading thesis, both of which make it un-
likely that she would support the separability
thesis; the second of which is based on devel-
opmental evidence. I start with the non-devel-
opmental argument. 
5.2 Cooperation and social conformity
First,  Millikan (2004)  rejects  the mindreading
thesis as part of her criticism of the reasoning
that leads to the separability thesis: she rejects
the joint assumptions that human predictions of
others’ behavior are based on mindreading and
that cooperation in human verbal communica-
tion is vulnerable to the risks of deception. On
the one hand, she argues that “most aspects of
social  living  involve  cooperation  in  ways  that
benefit to everyone […] for the most part, social
cooperation benefits both or all parties. There
is nothing mysterious about its evolution in this
respect” (Millikan 2004, pp. 21–22). In a nut-
shell, Millikan argues that the urge to explain
how the benefits of human communication are
not offset by the risks of deception is misplaced
on the grounds  that  the interests  of  speakers
and  hearers  are  sufficiently  similar,  if  not
identical.10 
10 As Godfrey-Smith (2013, p. 45) observes, sameness of interests in human
cooperation can be safely assumed in small contemporary communities,
but not on a large scale, and nor in an evolutionary context.
On the other hand, she argues that we use
belief-desire psychology, not for prediction, but
“for explanation after the fact” (Millikan 2004,
p. 22).  This is  consonant with her (1984, pp.
67–69)  earlier  claim that  while  human adults
have the ability to reflect on a speaker’s commu-
nicative intention if the automatic flow of con-
versation is  interrupted for one reason or  an-
other, normal verbal understanding does not re-
quire representing the speaker’s communicative
intention. Instead, normal verbal understanding
should be construed as a  conventional transfer
of  information  whereby  the  speaker  translates
her belief into an utterance, whose meaning is
in turn translated back by the addressee into a
newly acquired belief. 
Thus, Millikan rejects two of the major as-
sumptions on which the separability thesis rests.
She  underestimates  the  gap  between  the  in-
terests of speakers and hearers in human com-
munication and she minimizes the role of belief–
desire  psychology  in  the  prediction  of  others’
behavior. Interestingly, her rejection of both as-
sumptions rests in turn on her own competing
account of communicative acts. As she puts it,
“a surprise of this analysis of the conventional
nature of the information-transferring function
of the indicative is that believing what you hear
said in the indicative turns out to be a conven-
tional  act,  something  one  does  in  accordance
with convention” (Millikan 2005, p. 46).11 First
of  all,  Millikan (2004,  p.  23)  argues  that  hu-
mans  expect  others  to  behave  in  conformity
with social conventions, not on the basis of oth-
ers’  beliefs  and  desires.  Second,  she  further
speculates that the conventional behaviors that
are caused by a disposition to social conformity
may derive from natural selection the memetic
function  of  serving  a  coordinating  function
(ibid.). 
Clearly, being disposed to social conform-
ity  and  expecting  others  to  be  similarly  dis-
posed may help solve coordination problems (as
shown by driving on one side of the road). How-
ever, being disposed towards social conformity
is not sufficient to comply with social conven-
tions. Compliance requires learning, i.e., the ac-
11 Note that this quote seems to presuppose the negation of the separ-
ability thesis. 
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quisition of relevant true beliefs about the con-
tents of social conventions. Thus, the basic chal-
lenge for Millikan’s claim that humans expect
others  to  behave,  not  so  much in  accordance
with the contents  of  their  beliefs  and desires,
but in conformity with social conventions, is to
offer an account of how humans come to learn
and thereby know what it takes to act in con-
formity with social conventions. 
5.3 Counterpart reproduction 
This issue has been highlighted by the exchange
between  Tomasello’s (2006) comments on  Mil-
likan’s  (2005)  book  and  Millikan’s  (2006)  re-
sponse,  which  focuses  on  Millikan’s  (1998)
thesis that many conventions, whose function it
is  to  solve  coordination problems,  are  repro-
duced by what she calls  counterpart reproduc-
tion  (or  nuts and bolt  reproduction).  Typical
coordination problems involve at least two part-
ners, who share a common purpose that can be
achieved only if each partner plays its assigned
role,  where  both  partners  can  be  required  to
perform  either  the  same  act  or  two  distinct
complementary  acts.  In  counterpart  reproduc-
tion, when the respective roles of each partner
require them to perform two different comple-
mentary acts, one typically adjusts her behavior
to the other’s  and vice-versa.  Counterpart re-
production is exemplified by, e.g., handshake re-
production, the reproduction of  the respective
postures assumed by men and women in tradi-
tional dancing, the reproduction of  social  dis-
tances appropriate for conversation, or the re-
production of the use of chopsticks for eating.
Similarly,  Millikan (2005,  2006)  argues  that
counterpart reproduction also underlies the con-
tinued reproduction of conventional public-lan-
guage signs. 
Millikan (2005)  further  mentions  open,
partially  or  completely  blind,  conventional
leader–follower co-ordinations involved in joint
actions  based  on  shared  goals,  whereby  one
agent (the leader) introduces a component of a
pattern whose completion requires her partner
(the follower) to perform a complementary com-
ponent (ibid., pp. 12–14). One example of open
conventional leader–follower coordination is the
pattern whereby one agent selects her seat at an
arbitrary table in a restaurant and her partner
follows suit and selects his accordingly. One ex-
ample of a partially blind conventional leader–
follower coordination is the couch-moving pat-
tern whereby the leader affords the follower an-
ticipatory cues of her next move by ostensibly
exaggerating her own movements, where the fol-
lower’s familiarity with the pattern enables him
to  recognize  the  leader’s  ostensive  cues  and
thereby to  reproduce  the  complementary por-
tion of the joint action. Another of Millikan’s
examples  of  a  partially  blind  conventional
leader–follower coordination is the US mailbox-
flag convention, whereby the leader puts up a
flag after she has placed mail  in the mailbox
and the postman picks up the mail after per-
ceiving the flag. 
Much comparative work by Tomasello and
colleagues  (reported  by  Tomasello et  al. 2005
and  summarized  by  Tomasello 2006,  2008)
shows that while most communicative gestures
in chimpanzees are learnt by ontogenetic ritual-
ization,  most  communicative  behaviors  in  hu-
man infants are acquired by imitative learning.
As Tomasello (2006) argues, Millikan’s own re-
quirement that  the  reproduction of  a  conven-
tional pattern depends on “the weight of pre-
cedent”, not on its perceived intrinsic superior
ability to produce a desired result, seems better
fulfilled by a process of imitative learning than
by a process of trial and error whereby one indi-
vidual adjusts her behavior to another’s. There
seems to be nothing arbitrary (as there should
if  it  were  conventional)  about  an  individual’s
adjusting her behavior to another’s. While  To-
masello (2006) does not deny that counterpart
reproduction plays a significant role in cultural
transmission,  he  disputes  the  claim  that  the
output of counterpart reproduction qualifies as
conventional. 
Part of the gap between Millikan and To-
masello lies in what they take to be the proper
unit for the analysis of the mechanism underly-
ing the continued reproduction of conventional
patterns  involved  in  solving  problems  of  co-
ordination.  While  Tomasello  focuses  on  the
learning  capacities  of  single  individual  minds,
Millikan focuses on what can be achieved by the
Jacob, P. (2015). Millikan’s Teleosemantics and Communicative Agency.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 20(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570160 12 | 22
www.open-mind.net
reciprocal  adjustments  of  pairs  of  cooperative
partners.  For  example,  when  Millikan (2005,
2006) argues that counterpart reproduction un-
derlies the continued proliferation of the custom
of using chopsticks for eating in some cultures,
she construes the convention of using chopsticks
as  a  solution  to  the  problem of  coordination
between pairs of partners, some of whom buy
chopsticks and use them for eating and others
who manufacture chopsticks. The latter would
not  manufacture  chopsticks  unless  the  former
bought them and used them for  eating.  Con-
versely, the former would not buy them and use
them for eating unless the latter manufactured
them. 
But of  course,  as Millikan is aware,  this
leaves open the question of how young children
learn to use chopsticks for eating. As  Millikan
(2006,  pp.  45–46)  rightly  observes,  young hu-
man children understand their native language
long  before  they  can  speak  it.  Nor  can  they
learn to understand by imitating mature speak-
ers: as she puts it, “they don’t watch how other
people understand and then copy”. She further
argues that young children would never under-
stand their native tongue unless “their teachers”
spoke to them, but “their teachers” would never
speak to young children unless “they had had
some  reasonably  successful  experience”  with
previous listeners. This makes the continued re-
production  of  conventional  public-language
signs  fit  the  pattern  of  counterpart  reproduc-
tion. But still the question arises: how do young
children learn to produce words of their native
tongue? Vocal imitative learning may well play
an important role (cf. Hauser et al. 2002). In a
nutshell, according to Millikan the function of
conventions is  to solve coordination problems.
She offers an elegant account of the prolifera-
tion of conventions based on counterpart repro-
duction. Her account must make room for the
role of imitative learning in the way young hu-
man children learn either to use chopsticks for
eating or to produce (and not just understand)
words of their native tongues. As I shall argue
in  section  6.2,  evidence  shows  that  imitative
learning in young children rests on their ability
to construe the model’s demonstration as an os-
tensive communicative action. If  so, then Mil-
likan’s view that counterpart reproduction un-
derlies  the  proliferation  of  conventions  must
make room for the role of children’s ability to
recognize the model’s communicative intention. 
6 Teleosemantics and the puzzles of 
early human social cognition 
6.1 Millikan’s developmental puzzle
To further  undermine  the  mindreading  thesis,
Millikan  (1984,  2000,  2004,  2005) has also ap-
pealed to findings from the developmental psy-
chological  investigation  of  early  human  social
cognition, showing that “children younger than
about four, although fairly proficient in the use
of  language,  don’t  yet  have  concepts  of  such
things as beliefs, desires, and intentions” (Mil-
likan 2005, p. 204). If such children do not have
such concepts, then, unlike adults, they cannot
reflectively engage in tasks of mindreading, i.e.,
in  tracking  the  contents  of  others’  intentions,
beliefs, and desires. To the extent that they can
engage  in  verbal  understanding,  this  further
shows that verbal understanding cannot rest on
mindreading (or belief–desire psychology). 
As  Millikan  emphasizes,  much  develop-
mental evidence shows that before they are at
least four years old the majority of human chil-
dren  systematically  fail elicited-response  false-
belief  tasks.  (In  the  terminology  of  develop-
mental psychologists Baillargeon et al. 2010, eli-
cited-response tasks are tasks in which a parti-
cipant is requested to generate an explicit an-
swer in response to an explicit  question.)  For
example,  in  the  Sally-Anne  test,  after  Sally
places her toy in the basket, she leaves. While
Sally is away, Anne moves Sally’s toy from the
basket to the box. When Sally returns, parti-
cipants, who know the toy’s actual location, are
explicitly  asked  to  predict  where  Sally  (who
falsely believes her toy to be in the basket) will
look for her toy. The evidence shows that the
majority of three-year-olds, “although quite pro-
ficient  in  the  use  of  language”  (in  Millikan’s
terms, Millikan 2005, p. 204), typically point to
the box (i.e., the toy’s actual location), not to
the basket where the agent falsely believes her
toy to be (cf.  Wimmer & Perner 1983,  Baron-
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Cohen et al. 1985 and Wellman et al. 2001 for a
meta-analysis). 
Millikan assumes that the failure of most
three-year-olds  in  such  elicited-response  false-
belief  tasks demonstrates  that they lack what
she calls a “representational theory of mind”. In
a nutshell, she assumes that success at elicited-
response false-belief tasks is a necessary condi-
tion for crediting an individual with a repres-
entational  theory of  mind (i.e.,  the ability  to
track the contents of others’ false beliefs). Ac-
ceptance of  this assumption gives rise to Mil-
likan’s developmental puzzle,  which is “to un-
derstand how very young children can be aware
of the intentions and of the focus of attention of
those from whom they learn language without
yet having this sort of sophisticated theory of
mind” (Millikan 2005, p. 205). Before explaining
why  Millikan’s  assumption  is  contentious,  I
shall briefly examine Millikan’s solution to her
own puzzle. 
Millikan’s  solution  involves  three  related
ingredients, the most important of which is her
thesis that normal verbal understanding is an
extended form of perception (which does not re-
quire  thinking  about  a  speaker’s  intention  at
all). Second, she argues that young children can
understand the goal-directedness of a speaker’s
communicative action without tracking the con-
tent of her communicative intention. Third, she
argues that young children can understand the
referential focus of a speaker’s attention without
having a sophisticated theory of mind. As I un-
derstand it, much of the argument for the pos-
sibility of understanding the referential focus of
a speaker’s attention without having a sophist-
icated theory of mind rests on the thesis that
verbal  understanding  is  an  extended  form  of
perception. As I have already expressed doubts
about the thesis that verbal understanding is an
extended form of perception, I shall now briefly
examine the second thesis: that young children
could  understand  the  goal-directedness  of  a
speaker’s  communicative  without  tracking  the
content of her communicative intention. 
Millikan (2005,  pp.  206–207)  offers  two
main  reasons  for  granting  young  children  the
ability  to  recognize  the  goal-directedness  of  a
speaker’s communicative action without grant-
ing them a full representational theory of mind.
First, she argues that the evidence shows that
mammals (dogs and cats and non-human prim-
ates,  presumably,  as  well)  lack  a  representa-
tional theory of mind but have the ability to re-
cognize the goal-directedness of each other’s be-
havior. So by parity, very young children should
also be granted the ability to recognize the goal-
directedness of others’ actions, including speak-
ers’ communicative actions. Second, she argues
that communicative actions are cooperative ac-
tions. When young children are engaged in some
cooperative action (including a communicative
action) with a caretaker, they can easily keep
track of the shared goal of the cooperative ac-
tion, while tracking the focus of the speaker’s
visual  attention, without having a full  repres-
entational theory of mind. 
On the one hand, there is  evidence that
non-human primates recognize the goals of con-
specifics  engaged  in  the  execution  of  instru-
mental actions (Call & Tomasello 2008). On the
other hand, there is also evidence that non-hu-
man primates—and birds as well—can discrim-
inate  knowledgeable agents  (who  know  about,
e.g., food from visual perception) from ignorant
agents  (who  don’t  know  about  food  because
their line of vision is obstructed) in competitive
situations  (Bugnyar 2011;  Call &  Tomasello
2008;  Dally et al. 2006;  Hare et al. 2001;  To-
masello et al. 2003). But the question raised by
Millikan’s puzzle is to understand what enables
very  young  human  children  to  make  sense
jointly of a speaker’s goal and the focus of her
visual attention, when the speaker is performing
a communicative action, not an instrumental ac-
tion, in a  cooperative,  not a competitive,  con-
text.  The  fact  that  non-human  primates  can
represent the goal of an agent’s instrumental ac-
tion and discriminate a knowledgeable from an
ignorant  agent  in  a  competitive  context  falls
short of providing the required explanation.
Furthermore,  two  of  Millikan’s  assump-
tions are contentious in light of recent findings
from developmental psychology. One is her as-
sumption  that  young children  could  recognize
the goal-directedness of speakers’ communicat-
ive actions without a representational theory of
mind. The other is her assumption that success
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at elicited-response false-belief tasks should be
taken as  a  criterion  for  having  the  ability  to
track the contents of others’ false beliefs (and
therefore  having  a  representational  theory  of
mind).  I  shall  start  with  the  former,  which
amounts to denying the asymmetry between in-
strumental and communicative agency—which I
earlier dubbed the thesis of the ostensive nature
of human communicative agency.
6.2 The puzzle of imitative learning
The first relevant developmental finding, repor-
ted by Gergely et al. (2002), shows that approx-
imately one-year-old human children (fourteen-
month-olds) selectively imitate an agent’s odd
action. First, infants were provided with ostens-
ive cues whereby an agent made manifest her
intention to convey some valuable information
by looking into the infants’ eyes and addressing
them in motherese.  She  then told the infants
that  she  felt  cold  and  covered  her  shoulders
with a blanket.  She finally performed an odd
head-action whereby she turned a light box in
front  of  her  by  applying  her  head,  in  two
slightly different conditions. In the hands-occu-
pied condition, she used her hands in order to
hold the blanket around her shoulder while she
executed the head-action. In the hands-free con-
dition, she ostensibly placed her free hands on
the  table  while  she  executed  the  head-action.
Gergely et al. (2002) found that while 69% of
the children  replicated  the  head-action  in  the
hands-free  condition,  only  21%  did  in  the
hands-occupied  condition.  In  the  hands-occu-
pied  condition,  the  majority  of  children  used
their  own  hands  to  turn  the  light  box  on.
Csibra &  Gergely (2005,  2006)  further  report
that the asymmetry between infants’ replication
of the model’s odd head-action in the hands-free
and hands-occupied  conditions  vanishes  if  the
model  fails  to  provide  infants  with  ostensive
cues. 
Gergely &  Csibra (2003)  have  reported
evidence that twelve-month-olds expect  agents
engaged in the execution of instrumental actions
to select the most efficient action as a means to-
wards achieving their goal (or goal-state), in the
context  of  relevant  situational  constraints.  So
the findings on imitation reported by Gergely et
al. (2002) raise the following puzzle. Many more
infants replicated the agent’s head-action when
the  teleological  relation  between  the  agent’s
means and the agent’s goal was opaque (in the
hands-free condition) than when it was trans-
parent (in the hands-occupied condition). Why
did  infants  reproduce  the  agent’s  head-action
more  when  it  was  a  less efficient  means  of
achieving the agent’s goal of switching the light
box on? 
The  Gricean  thesis  about  the  ostensive
nature of communicative agency and the asym-
metry between instrumental and communicative
agency is relevant to answering this puzzle. Ar-
guably, reception of  ostensive signals prepared
the infants to interpret the agent’s action as a
communicative, not an instrumental, action. It
made manifest to the infants that the agent in-
tended to make something novel  and relevant
manifest to them by her subsequent non-verbal
communicative  action.  In  the  hands-occupied
condition,  the  infants  learnt  how contact  was
necessary in  order  to turn  on the  light  bulb,
which was part of an unfamiliar device. Since
the  model’s  hands  were  occupied,  the  infants
whose own hands were free assumed that that
they were free to select the most efficient means
at their disposal to achieve the same goal as the
model.  In the hands-free condition, the model
could have used her hands, but she did not. So
the infants learnt from the model’s non-verbal
demonstration that they could turn the light on
by applying their own heads. 
On the one hand, the evidence shows that
infants construe imitative learning as a response
to  an  agent’s  communicative  action  and  that
they selectively imitate a model’s  action as a
function  of  what  they  take  to  be  relevantly
highlighted by the model’s  communicative act
(cf. Southgate et al. 2009). On the other hand,
further evidence shows that newborns prefer to
look at faces with direct gaze over faces with
averted  gaze.  Right  after  birth,  they  display
sensitivity to eye-contact, infant-directed speech
or  motherese,  and  infant-contingent  distal  re-
sponsivity. If preceded by ostensive signals, an
agent’s gaze shift has been shown to generate in
preverbal human infants a referential  expecta-
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tion,  i.e.,  the  expectation  that  the  agent  will
refer to some object (Csibra & Volein 2008, cf.
Csibra &  Gergely 2009, and  Gergely &  Jacob
2013, for review). 
One  further  intriguing  piece  of  evidence
for  the early sensitivity of  human toddlers  to
the ostensive  nature of  human communicative
agency is offered by experiments that shed new
light on the classical A-not-B perseveration er-
ror phenomenon first reported by Piaget (1954).
Infants between eight and twelve months are en-
gaged  in  an  episodic  hide-and-seek  game  in
which an adult repeatedly hides a toy under one
(A) of two opaque containers (A and B) in full
view of the infant. After each hiding event, the
infant is allowed to retrieve the object. During
test  trials  where  the  demonstrator  places  the
object  repeatedly  under  container  B,  infants
continue to perseveratively search for it under
container A where it had been previously hid-
den. Experimental findings reported by Topal et
al. (2008) show that minimizing the presence of
ostensive cues results in significant decreases of
the perseverative bias  in ten-month-olds.  This
finding is consistent with the assumption that
infants do not interpret the hide-and-seek game
as  a  game,  but  instead as  a  teaching  session
about the proper location of a toy.
All  this  evidence  strongly  suggests  that
human infants are prepared from the start to
recognize nonverbal ostensive referential signals
and action–demonstrations  addressed  to  them
as encoding an agent’s communicative intention
to make manifest  her informative intention to
make some relevant state affairs manifest to the
addressee.  But  of  course  this  raises  a  puzzle:
how could preverbal infants recognize an agent’s
communicative intention to make manifest her
informative intention? A novel approach to this
puzzle has been insightfully suggested by Csibra
(2010). According to Csibra, very young infants
might well be in a position similar to that of a
foreign addressee of a verbal communicative act,
who is unable to retrieve a speaker’s informat-
ive  intention for  lack of  understanding of  the
meaning  of  the  speaker’s  utterance.  Nonethe-
less,  the  foreign  addressee  may well  recognize
being the target of the speaker’s communicative
intention on the basis of the speaker’s ostensive
behavior.  Furthermore,  ostensive  signals  to
which preverbal human infants have been shown
to be uniquely sensitive can plausibly be said to
code the presence of an agent’s communicative
intention. If this is correct, then little (if any)
further work would be left for preverbal infants
to infer the presence of a speaker’s communicat-
ive intention after receiving ostensive signals. 
6.3 The puzzle about early false-belief 
understanding
As  Millikan  has  emphasized,  much  develop-
mental psychology has shown that the majority
of three-year-olds fail  elicited-response false-be-
lief tasks. For example, when asked to predict
where an agent with a false belief will look for
her  toy,  most  three-year-olds  who  know  the
toy’s location point to the toy’s actual location,
and not to the empty location where the mis-
taken agent believes her toy to be. However, in
the past ten years or so, developmental psycho-
logists  have  further  designed  various  spontan-
eous-response false-belief tasks, in which parti-
cipants are not asked any question and therefore
not requested to produce any answer. Typical
spontaneous-response  tasks  involve  the  use  of
the  violation-of-expectation  and  anticipatory-
looking paradigms, which involve two steps. In
habituation  or  familiarization  trials,  parti-
cipants are first experimentally induced to form
expectations by being repeatedly exposed to one
and the same event. Second, in test trials of vi-
olation-of-expectation experiments, participants
are presented with either an expected or an un-
expected event. By measuring the time during
which participants respectively look at the ex-
pected vs. the unexpected event, psychologists
get evidence about the nature and content of
the infants’ expectations formed during the ha-
bituation or familiarization trials. Psychologists
can also use the anticipatory-looking paradigm
and  experimentally  determine  where  parti-
cipants first look in anticipation of the agent’s
action,  thereby  revealing  their  expectation
about the content of the agent’s belief. 
Thus, in a seminal study based on the vi-
olation-of-expectation  paradigm  by  Onishi &
Baillargeon (2005),  fifteen-month-olds  saw  an
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agent reach for her toy either in a green box or
in a yellow box when she had either a true or a
false belief about her toy’s location. Onishi and
Baillargeon  report  that  fifteen-month-olds
looked reliably longer when the agent’s action
was incongruent rather than congruent with the
content of either her true or false belief. In a
study  based  on  the  anticipatory  looking
paradigm,  twenty-five-month-olds  were  shown
to  look  correctly  towards  the  empty  location
where a mistaken agent believed her toy to be,
in anticipation of her action (Southgate et al.
2007).  Many  further  subsequent  studies  show
that toddlers and even preverbal human infants
are able to track the contents of others’  false
beliefs and expect others to act in accordance
with the contents of their true and false beliefs. 
In  a  classical  experiment  by  Woodward
(1998), six-month-olds were familiarized with an
agent’s action, who repeatedly chose one of two
toys. In the test trials, the spatial locations of
the toys were switched and the infants  either
saw the agent select the same toy as before at a
new location or a new toy at the old location.
six-month-olds  looked  reliably  longer  at  the
former than at the latter condition. Luo & Bail-
largeon (2005) further showed that infants do
not look reliably longer at a change of target if,
in  the  familiarization  trials,  the  agent  re-
peatedly reached for the same object, but there
was no competing object (for further discussion
cf. Jacob 2012). This result has been widely in-
terpreted  as  showing  that  six-month-olds  are
able to ascribe a preference to an agent.  Luo
(2011) further found that ten-month-olds who
know that an agent is in fact confronted with
only  one object (not two) ascribe a preference
to the agent if  she  falsely believes that she is
confronted with a pair of objects, but not if the
agent knows (as the infants do) that she is con-
fronted with only one object. 
Thus,  the  psychological  investigation  of
early human social  cognition is currently con-
fronted with a puzzle different from that con-
fronted  by Millikan:  on  the  one  hand,  robust
findings show that the majority of three-year-
olds fail elicited-response false-belief tasks such
as the Sally-Anne test. On the other hand, more
recent  findings  based  on spontaneous-response
tasks show that preverbal infants expect others
to act in accordance with the contents of their
true and false beliefs. The puzzle is: how do we
make  sense  of  the  discrepancy  between  both
sets of experimental findings? 
So  far,  psychologists  have  offered  two
broad strategies for this, one of which assumes
(as  Millikan  does)  that  success  at  elicited-re-
sponse false-belief tasks is a necessary condition
of the ability to ascribe false beliefs to others,
which is taken to be the output of “a cultural
process tied to language acquisition” (Perner &
Ruffman 2005, p. 214). Their burden is to ex-
plain away the findings about preverbal infants
without crediting them with the ability to track
the contents of others’ false beliefs. Thus, the
majority  of  “cultural  constructivist”  psycholo-
gists  offer  low-level  associationist  accounts  of
the findings about preverbal  infants  based on
spontaneous-response tasks. Other psychologists
(including  Baillargeon et  al. 2010;  Bloom &
German 2000 Leslie 2005;  Leslie et  al. 2004;
Leslie et al. 2005; Scott et al. 2010) argue that
the findings about preverbal infants show that
they can track the contents of others’ false be-
liefs. Their burden is to explain why elicited-re-
sponse false-belief  tasks are so challenging for
three-year-olds.  The prevalent non-constructiv-
ist  explanation  is  the  processing-load  account
offered by Baillargeon and colleagues. 
The core of the associationist strategy is
to account for findings about preverbal human
infants based on spontaneous-response tasks on
the basis of a three-way association between the
agent, the object, and its location. It postulates
that infants will look longer in the test trials at
events  that  depart  more  strongly  from  the
three-way association generated by the familiar-
ization trials. For example, in the test trials of
Onishi & Baillargeon (2005), infants should look
longer when the agent reaches for her toy in the
yellow box  if  in  the  familiarization  trials  the
agent placed her toy in the green box on three
repeated occasions. 
The  main  obstacle  for  the  associationist
path is a recent study by  Senju et al. (2011)
based on the anticipatory-looking paradigm. In
the  familiarization  stage,  eighteen-month-olds
experience  the  effect  of  wearing  either  an
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opaque blindfold through which they cannot see
or a trick blindfold through which they can see.
In the first trials of the test phase, the children
are familiarized to seeing an agent retrieve her
toy at the location where a puppet has placed it
in front of her. The agent’s action is always pre-
ceded by a pair of visual and auditory cues. In
the last test trial, the agent first sees the pup-
pet place the toy in one of the two boxes; she
then ostensibly covers her eyes with a blindfold,
and finally the puppet removes the toy. After
the puppet disappears,  the agent removes her
blindfold and the cues are produced. Using an
eye-tracker, Senju et al. (2011) found that only
infants who had experienced an opaque blind-
fold,  not  infants  who had experienced a trick
see-through blindfold, reliably made their first
saccade towards the empty location in anticipa-
tion of the agent’s action. 
Senju et al.’s (2011) findings are inconsist-
ent with the associationist strategy: since all in-
fants saw exactly the same events, they should
have formed exactly the same threefold associ-
ation between the agent, the toy, and the loca-
tion, and on this basis they should have gazed
at  the  same  location  in  anticipation  of  the
agent’s action. But they did not. Only infants
whose view had been previously obstructed by
an opaque blindfold, not those whose view had
not been obstructed by a trick blindfold, expec-
ted the blindfolded agent to mistakenly believe
that the object was still in the opaque container
after the puppet removed it. 
The  evidence  against  the  associationist
strategy is also evidence against the assumption
(accepted by Millikan) that success at elicited-
response false-belief tasks is a necessary condi-
tion  for  having  a  representational  theory  of
mind and being able to track the contents of
others’ false beliefs. But this assumption is un-
likely to be correct if, as several critics of the
cultural constructivist strategy have argued, the
ability to ascribe false beliefs to others is not a
sufficient  condition  for  success  at  elicited-re-
sponse  false-belief  tasks.  As  advocates  of  the
processing-load  account  (Baillargeon et  al.
2010)  have  argued,  an  agent  could  have  the
ability to ascribe false beliefs to others and still
fail  elicited-response  false-belief  tasks  for  at
least three reasons: she could fail to understand
the  meaning  of  the  linguistically-encoded sen-
tence used by the experimenter to ask the ques-
tion. She could fail to select the content of the
agent’s false belief in the process whereby she
answers the experimenter’s question. She could
fail to have the executive-control resources ne-
cessary to inhibit the prepotent tendency to an-
swer the question on the basis of the content of
her own true belief. I will now argue that solv-
ing the puzzle about early belief-understanding
may well depend on acceptance of the Gricean
thesis of the ostensive nature of communicative
agency  and  the  asymmetry  between  instru-
mental and communicative agency. 
I now want to offer a speculative solution
to  the  puzzle  about  early  false-belief  under-
standing based on two related Gricean assump-
tions. The first is the asymmetry between the
non-ostensive  nature  of  instrumental  agency
and the ostensive nature of human communicat-
ive  agency.  The  second  related  assumption  is
that the human ability to track the content of
the false belief of an agent of an instrumental
action must be a by-product of the ability to
deal with deception (e.g., lying) in the context
of human communicative agency. 
In the typical Sally-Anne elicited-response
false-belief  task,  participants  are  requested  to
make sense of two actions performed by two dif-
ferent agents at the same time: they must track
the contents of  the motivations and epistemic
states of a mistaken agent engaged in the execu-
tion of an instrumental action (Sally) and they
must also make sense of the communicative ac-
tion performed by the experimenter who asks
them “Where will Sally look for her toy?” The
findings  based  on  spontaneous-response  tasks
strongly suggest that much before they become
proficient in language use,  young human chil-
dren are able to spontaneously track the con-
tents  of  the  false  beliefs  of  agents  of  instru-
mental actions.  So the question is:  what is  it
about  the  experimenter’s  question  that  biases
them towards pointing to the toy’s actual loca-
tion? 
In  Helming et al. (2014), we have argued
that two biases are at work, one of which is a
referential bias and the other of which is a co-
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operative bias. The referential bias itself turns
on two components. On the one hand, the ex-
perimenter could not ask the question “Where
will the agent look for her toy?” unless she re-
ferred to the toy. On the other hand, the experi-
menter  shares  the  participants”  correct  epi-
stemic perspective on the toy’s location. In an-
swering  the  experimenter’s  question,  parti-
cipants have the option of mentally representing
either  the  toy’s  actual  location  or  the  empty
location (where the mistaken agent believes her
toy  to  be).  The  experimenter’s  question  may
bias young children’s answer towards the actual
location by virtue of the fact that the experi-
menter both referred to the toy (whose actual
location  they  know)  and  shared  the  parti-
cipants’  correct  epistemic  perspective  on  the
toy’s actual location (at the expense of the mis-
taken  agent’s  incorrect  perspective  on  the
empty location). What we further call the co-
operative bias is the propensity of young chil-
dren to help an agent with a false belief about
her toy’s location achieve the goal of her instru-
mental action by pointing to the actual location
(cf.  Warneken &  Tomasello 2006,  2007;  Knud-
sen &  Liszkowski 2012),  in  accordance  with
their own true belief about the toy’s actual loc-
ation. If so, then young children might interpret
the prediction question “Where  will Sally look
for her toy?” as a normative question: “Where
should Sally look for her toy?” Of course, the
correct answer to the normative question is the
toy’s  actual  location,  not  the  empty  location
where the mistaken agent believes her toy to be.
7 Conclusion
The goal of  this paper was to assess the gap
between Millikan’s particular views about some
of the proximate psychological mechanisms un-
derlying human communication and three core
assumptions  of  the  Gricean  approach:  the
mindreading thesis, the separability thesis, and
the ostensive nature of communicative agency. I
have  criticized  five  of  Millikan’s  basic  claims
about psychological mechanisms: (i) verbal un-
derstanding  is  best  construed  as  an  extended
form of  perception;  (ii)  hearers  can track the
domains  of  intentional  conventional  signs
without representing any of the speaker’s psy-
chological states; (iii)  the overlap between the
interests of speakers and hearers undermines the
separability thesis; (iv) humans can predict oth-
ers’ behavior out of social conformity; (v) devel-
opmental  psychology  supports  the  view  that
neither verbal understanding nor language ac-
quisition  requires  a  representational  theory  of
mind. 
Millikan’s  major  teleosemantic  contribu-
tion  has  been  to  open  an  entirely  novel  ap-
proach to the continued reproduction of inten-
tional  conventional  public-language  signs.  As
was  shown  by  the  discussion  of  whether  her
view of the proper function of descriptive and
prescriptive  utterances  is  consistent  with  the
separability thesis,  there is  room for disagree-
ment  about  particular  psychological  mechan-
isms within a teleosemantic approach. I do not
think  that  Millikan’s  teleosemantic  framework
for addressing the continued reproduction of in-
tentional conventional signs mandates the par-
ticular choice of proximate psychological mech-
anisms that she recommends. One of the major
challenges for the scientific investigation of cul-
tural evolution is to make sure that the proxim-
ate psychological mechanisms that underlie the
continued reproduction of human cultural con-
ventions are supported by findings from experi-
mental psychological research, in particular de-
velopmental psychology.
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